Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1959

George A. Chase, Jr. v. Nicholas G. Morgan, Sr.,
Charitable Foundation : Reply Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Ben D. Browning; John H. Allen; Attorneys for Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Chase v. Morgan, No. 8981 (Utah Supreme Court, 1959).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3240

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

ALJGo

1959

IN THE SUPREME COU·RT
of the

STATE OF UTfH

I L ED
1 51959-·

/};P p

---·--,----'~~------------"-'': _______________________
,_ :rk, Suprer.-:o Court, Utah

GEORGE A. CHASE, JR.,
Appellant,

-vs.-

Case Number

NICHOLAS G. MORGAN, SR.
CHARITABLE FOUNDATION,
Respondent.

8981

On Appeal frorn the District Court for
Salt Lake County, Utah

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

BEN D. BROWNING and
JOHN H. ALLEN
Attorneys for Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
REPLY TO ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS__________

1

POINT I. THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT APPELLANT PERFORMED ONLY THE PERSONAL SERVICES OF A MIDDLEMAN AND DID NOT PERFORM
THE SERVICES OF A BROKER. ------------------------------------

3

POIN'T II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
HOLDING THAT APPELLANT IS NOT BARRED
FROM RECOVERY BECAUSE OF THE PROVISIONS
OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 195'3, 25-5-1 and 255-4, Subdivision 5 --------------------------------------------------------------------

5

CONICLUSION ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

8

AUTHORITIES CITED
Barnard v. Hardy, 77 Utah 218, 293 P.ac. 12-------·------------------------

6

Case v. Ralph, 56 Utah 243, 188 Pac. 640 ........ ------------------------------

6

Mifflin v. Shiki, 77 Utah 190, 293 Pac. 1. ....... ----------------------------

6

Ney v. Harrison, 5 Utah (2d) 217, 299 P. (2d) 1114............ 7, 8
Smith Realty v. Dipietro, 77 Utah 176, 292 Pac. 915................

6

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Annotated, 1953:
Sec. 25-5-1

------------------------------------------------·--7·-----------------------------

5

Sec. 25-5'-4 ( 5) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------6, 7
Sec. 40-6-1, et seq. (1957 Supp.) ------------------------------------------

5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

REPLY TO ADDITIONAL STATEMENT
OF FkCTS
Respondent's additional statement of facts contains
matters which must be set in proper context for the Court
to have a clear understanding of the issues of this case.
First, Respondent 8ets forth an interrogatory to
Appellant and the an8wer thereto, notwithstanding the
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Trial Uourt 's specific refusal to receive this evidence~
(Tr. 265) Set in proper context, Appellant's testimony
taken and harmonized with the Answer to this Interrogatory shows that he was a middleman rendering a personal service, and not a seller of real estate as Respondent
contends.
Second, Respondent has set forth a portion of the
Pretrial Order (Brief 7), where it is written "'The plaintiff will further contend that it had no agreement with
defendant .. ," when the true text of the Pretrial Order
was a statement in the alternative as follows: "The plaintiff will further contend that vf he had no agreement with
defendant for the pay-1nent by defendant to plaintiff and
his assignor, that he had an agreement with the Sierra
Madre Oil Company ... '~ ( en1phasis added). Let there
be no mistake that Appellant does clai1n an agreement
with Respondent which i::; the smue agreen1ent the Trial
Court found. (Finding of Fact X o. 10)
Third, Respondent has published as a fact that it
makes no clailn to- the last three payn1ents of $13,826.54
each, totaling $41.-t-79.62, but that the Escrm\T Con1pany
is holding one paym(lnt. and that it has paid two payments to

tht~

President of Sierra .JJadre Oil Company,

Donald MeDonald. Tlw eYidenee discloses that Respond('llt

paid oYPr tla' uwnies aboYP in part upon the under-

standing that Sierra Madre Oil Company. Donald
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McDonald and their attorney would stand behind the
Respondent in resisting Appellant's claim. (Tr. 217, 218)
Respondent, through its President, agreed with Arch
MacDonald, who supplied the rnoney for Sierra 1\t.fadre
Oil Company, that none of the funds here involved would
be paid to either Sierra Madre or Dr. Donald McDonald,
its Geologist President. ( Tr. 72, 73)

STATEl\1:ENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT APPELLANT PERFORMED ONLY THE PERSONAL SERVI'CES OF A MIDDLEMAN AND DID NOT PERFORM THE SERVICES OF A
BROKER.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT
PLAINTIFF IS NOT BARRED FROM RE,COVERY BECAUSE
OF 'THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953,
25-5-1 AND 25-5-4, SUBDIVISION 5.

ARGUMEN1,
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT APPELLANT PERFORMED ONLY THE PERSONAL SERVICES OF A MIDDLE-
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MAN AND DID NOT PERFORM THE SERVICES OF A
BROKER.

Appellant's only duties under the contract with Respondent were to find a prospective purchaser for oil and
gas leases, and to introduce this prospective purchaser
to Respondent. He had no authority and was not directed
to do anything else. As soon as the introduction was
made Appellants services \Yere at an end. He was not
required under the contract to find a purchaser who was
"ready, able and willing" to purchase the property, nor
was he required to be present nor was he present during
the negotiations between the prospective purchaser and
the Respondent, and he had no pmver to influence the decisions of the negotiating parties. These are the facts
which fonn the basis for the clann that ~lppellant was a
mere middle1nan, and whieh distinguish his services from
those of a broker. Bespondent denied the existence of any
agreement and therefore produced no evidence as to its
terms. The Trial ·Court specifically found that such
agremnent did exist.

~lll

other eYidence in the record

shows only an agremnent for the personal services of a
middlmnan. K tnnerous eases with si1nilar facts were discussed in the argument of Point I (.:\.) of Appellant's
Brief, and Appellant does not feel that it is necessary to
di~en~s tlH'St' l'HSPs

again. Appellant also feels that the
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question of the application of the Real Estate Brokers
Statutes to the oil and gas business was adequately discussed, and does not require further discussion.
Appellant has also pointed out the conflicting
theories that prevail concerning the nature of an oil and
gas interest, and that this Court has not decided whether
an interest in an oil u-nd gas lease is "Real Estate." Sections 40-6-1, et seq. Utah Code Annotated) 1953 (1957
Supp.), as also pointed out, seen1 to indicate that the
Lessee's interest is only the right to appropriate the oil
and gas produced, the logical conclusion therefore being
that the interest, is in the nature of a profit a pendre, and
not real estate.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT
PLAINTIFF IS NOT BARRED FROM RE,COVERY BECAUSE
OF THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH ·CODE ANNOTATED, 1953,
25-5-1 AND 25-5-4, SUBDIVISION 5.

Plaintiff has heretofore argued that an interest in an
oil and gas lease is not "real estate" and should not be
governed by the statutes concerning real estate brokers,
but Plaintiff does not make any claim to an interest in
any real estate conveyed, and the provisions of 25-5-1,
requiring a writing for conveyances of real estate, are,
therefore, not in issue here,
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Plaintiff is Inaking a claiin for cmnpensation for his
personal service rendered in the sale of oil and gas leases.
Assuming for the purpose of argument that the leases
in question are real estate, the Court did not err in holding that 25-5-4 ( 5) did not preclude recovery. This Court
is not committed to the doctrine that before recovery may
be had for services rendered in the sale of real property,
such services must be rendered pursuant to a written
agreement. The doctrine to which the Court is committed
is that a recovery for such services must be based on an
express agreement for such services, and this agreement,
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing, subscribed by the party to be charged there·with. Case v.

Ralph, 56 Utah 243,
v. Dipietro, 77 Utah
question of whether
be in writing. Both

188 Pac. G±O, and Smith Realty Co.
176, :29:2 Pac. 915, did not decide the

or not this express agreement must
of those cases merely held that the

pleadings therein did not plead an express contract, and
they, therefore, did not state a cause of action. Xor do
the cases of lllifflin c. Shiki, 77 Utah 190, 293 Pac. 1, and

Barnard v. Hardy, 77 Utah :218,

:2~)3

Pac. 12, stand for

that proposition. Those cases were decided against the
broker because the properties "·ere sold under different
terms than were found in the
<·a~P

broker~·

contracts. Neither

held that the l'xpress agreement n1ust be in writing.
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Ney v. Ho/rri-0on) 5 Utah (2d) 217, 299 P. (2d)

1114, is the latest pronouncement of this Court concerning Section 25-5-4(5). In that case there was ample evidence to prove an express oral contract to pay a conlmission for the sale of defendants' property. The earnest
money contract on which the sale \vas rnade contained a.
provision which recited the terms of the sellers' agree~
ment to pay a commission and was signed by_ the de~
fendant. The Supreme Court held that this memorandun1
was sufficient to satisfy the statute, and held :
A memorandun1, in order to make enforceable a contract within the statute, may be any
document or writing, formal or infonnal, signed
by the party to be charged ... which states with
reasonable certainty:
(a) each party to the contract either by his
own nmne, or by such a description as will serve
to identify him ... and
(b) the land, goods or other subject-matter
to which the contract relates, and
(c) the terms and conditions of all the
promises constituting the contract and by whom
and to whmn the prmnises were made.
The Supreme Court further stated:
. . . our statute, unlike that of many states,
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does not call for the contract itself to be in wr.iting; it is enough if there is "some note or memorandum thereof" which evidences the contract.
(l~Inphasis added)

The rule, therefore, is: An oral contract to pay a
commission, entered into before the services are rendered,
and later reduced to a note or memorandum, signed by
the party to be charged and setting forth the terms of
the contract, will satisfy the statute.
The Trial Court properly held that the letter sent
to plaintiff by defendant fully satisfies the requirements
set down inNey v. Harrison, supra, to wit:
(a) it is signed by the party to· be charged;
(b) it states \\'ith certainty the parties to the contract, the subject-1natter of the contract and
the tenns and conditions of the contract.

UOXCLUSIOX
Appelant perfonned personal serYices under a contract with Respondent, which contract was evidenced by
a written meuwrandu1n. Appellant has not been compensated for thel"\P l"\PrYiePl"\ and Respondent has ad1nitted that
it does not <'laim the uwney. 'rhe Trial Court should
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therefore be ordered to grant judgment as prayed for
by Appellant.

Respectfully subn1itted,

BEN D. BROWNING and
JOHN H. ALLEN
Attorneys for Appellant
1020 !{earns Building,

Salt Lake City 1, Utah
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